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Strategic Insights: Should General Dempsey
Resign? Army Professionals and the Moral Space
for Military Dissent
October 21, 2014 | Dr. Don M. Snider

Given that all Army professionals have taken an oath to “support and defend the Constitution,” in
what instances may, or even should, the stewards of the profession dissent in a public way—including
resignation or retirement—from an administration’s policy that they believe to be so incorrect as to be
ineffective, potentially endangering the Republic’s security.
This is not a new issue, in fact far from it. Our Republic’s history has many examples of civilmilitary discord in which senior military leaders have dissented in various ways from an
administration’s decisions—from General Douglas MacArthur in the Korean era, to General Ronald
Fogleman during the post-Cold War Defense reductions, to more recently Lieutenant General
Gregory Newbold and others in the “revolt of the generals” during the Bush administration’s invasion
of Iraq.1 In that instance, in 2002 Newbold, then director of operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
quietly retired even though he was rumored to be in the running for the next Commandant of the
Marine Corps, acknowledging later that he had done so because he objected to the planning of the
upcoming war in Iraq.
Now, in early fall of 2014, the issue has been raised again as several military leaders have
acknowledged publicly their frustrations and disagreements with the Obama administration’s policies
for the current airpower-only campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in those
countries—policies for which uniformed professionals hold the most extensive military expertise. As
one would expect, respected voices appear on both sides of the debate as it focuses now on potential
actions by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even though he has not
indicated what those actions, if any, might be.
Arguing in favor of more forceful forms of dissent is Seth Cropsey of the Hudson Institute:

Senior officers must accept their commander in chief's judgment and carry out orders. But
they and like-minded advisers have another option: resigning. Not to embarrass the
administration or cause a constitutional crisis, but to indicate the gravity of the ISIS threat.
Until stopped, ISIS or its collaborators are likely to mount an attack against the U.S.
homeland with the aim of equaling or surpassing al Qaeda’s 9/11 [September 11, 2001]
success. A military commander's resignation, accompanied by a clear and respectful
explanation, would prompt a needed debate over U.S. strategy to achieve the president's goal
“to degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS. . . . Politics is, by human nature and design,
complex and messy. It exists in the military no less than in other large organizations. But the
stakes are particularly high where the nation's security is at risk—as it now is. Clarity of
purpose is essential and where it is lacking—as in how to defeat ISIS—senior military officers
can make an important difference with their actions.2
On the other side of the debate is Professor Peter Feaver of Duke University, a very respected scholar
and practitioner of civil-military relations in America. His take is quite different from Cropsey’s:
Advocating resignation and protest like this is bad counsel and would do much to undermine
healthy civil-military relations if it ever became accepted practice among senior officers. . . .
This does not mean the military lacks all recourse whatsoever. On the contrary, it has three
courses of action available to a dissenting senior officer, all well-grounded in democratic
civil-military norms.
First and most importantly, the military has both the right and the duty to speak up in
private policymaking deliberations, offering its counsel on the likely risks and benefits of
different courses of action. . . . Second, when asked to do so in sworn testimony in
congressional hearings, all flag and general officers have not just the right but the obligation
to offer their private military advice even if it differs from administration policy. In fact, all
flag and general officers have already sworn under oath that they will do just that—it is the
first question on the confirmation form for all senior officers, and the Senate will not confirm
them to their promoted rank if they fail to promise to provide such candid advice. . . . Third,
the military has the right—and, I would argue, the obligation—to clarify the public record
when senior civilians misrepresent the content of their advice in public.3
Even Newbold has now re-entered the debate, stating that some extreme circumstances may require a
break with military tradition:
In time of war, we know that our misjudgments—whether through rash actions or timidity—
are paid in blood by the most selfless and patriotic of our nation’s youth. . . . While military
leaders almost always should follow the prescription of ‘counsel in private, praise in public,’
there are occasionally and rarely instances, where intelligence used to justify conflict is
manipulated or judgments on the use of force are so flawed that an experienced military
leader must (as we say) speak truth to power.4
So should General Dempsey consider resignation? What is the role of the Stewards of the Army
Profession with respect to domestic civil-military relations—how best for them to maintain the
necessary trust of the American people, while at the same time disagreeing in an appropriate manner
with civilian leaders who, by our Constitution, rightly exercise authority over them?

A more thorough review of American civil-military relations is well beyond the scope of this
article.5 Suffice it to say that such relations are usually laden with healthy tensions.6 But, certainly,
key among the factors that should frame such an analysis is the Army’s professional ethic. For its own
stewards, in its new doctrine of profession the Army has explained:7
The key condition for effective American civil-military relations is a high level of mutual
respect and trust between civilian and military leaders. Army professionals fulfill their
obligation to create such mutual respect and trust by strictly adhering to a set of norms
established by law and past practice:
The Army Profession’s principal obligation is to support the democratic institutions
and policymaking processes of our government. Military leaders should offer their
expertise and advice candidly to appropriate civilian leadership within the
Department of Defense and more broadly within the JIIM [Joint, Interagency,
Intergovernmental, and Multinational] community.
Civilian decisionmakers seek and consider professional military advice in the context
of policy deliberations. Army professionals properly confine their advisory role to the
policymaking process and do not engage publicly in policy advocacy or dissent.

As the last bullet implies, little has apparently changed since Samuel Huntington noted over 5
decades ago, that “loyalty and obedience” are to be the cardinal military virtues.8 This precept has
remained embedded in the Army’s professional ethos to this day, especially for the Stewards of the
Army Profession. But, given the current debates can something more be said other than, “. . . do not
engage publicly in policy advocacy or dissent”? Can Army doctrine be further explicated? Specifically,
how are Army Stewards to interpret “. . . engage publicly”?
I think we can say more, and, to do so, we must draw on the thoughts of two other scholars in the
field. First, Dr. Martin Cook, the Stockdale Chair of Ethics at the Naval War College, has focused on
the challenge the potential dissenter faces when he or she uses discretionary professional judgments
to arrive at a decision to dissent. To Cook, the challenge is:
. . . how to understand professionalism so that two equal values, somewhat in tension with
each other, are preserved: the unquestioned subordination of military officers to
constitutionally legitimate civilian leadership; and the equally important role of the officer
corps in providing professional military advice, unalloyed with extraneous political or
cultural considerations.9
As Cook and others believe, part of that judgment must rest on the idea that professionals are
obligated not only to serve the client (in this case, ultimately, the state and its Constitution) but also
are obligated to have “their own highly developed internal sense of the proper application of the
professional knowledge.”10 In other words, dissent without insubordination to civilian authority can
rightly be based on loyalty to the profession’s expert knowledge and its effective and ethical
application. This is the moral obligation owed the client by the profession.

The second scholar of interest here is Dr. James Burk, military sociologist at the Texas A&M;
University. In a challenge to Huntington’s functionalist assertion that loyalty and obedience are the
cardinal military virtues, Burk contends that:
Military professionals require autonomy, to include moral autonomy, to be competent actors
held responsible for what they do. By autonomy, I mean the ability to govern or control one’s
actions with some degree of freedom. Autonomous action is a precondition for responsible
obedience and the opposite of blind obedience. . . . [There is a] conceptual space within which
military professionals exercise moral discretion. The map includes a definition of responsible
obedience and disobedience. But it also includes two types of actions that do not fit the classic
definitions of these alternatives. They each exhibit a defect in which discretion is used either
to do what is morally wrong or to do what was explicitly not authorized. Nevertheless, they
are not simply forms of disobedience. They are “protected” actions, protected because the
discretion to commit them preserves the autonomy on which the moral responsibility of the
military profession depends.11
As I have stated before, I believe that Burk’s argument is compelling.12 On rare occasion the exercise
of discretionary professional judgment may lead to acts of dissent beyond the accepted norms offered
by Professor Feaver. I believe such acts by the profession’s stewards can fall in Burk’s “protected
space,” a space that may indeed require acts of dissent or disobedience if “the moral responsibility of
the profession is to be preserved.” Professions simply must preserve the autonomy to “profess” based
on the uniqueness of their expert knowledge held in trust for their client, or they cease to be
professions.
But that is a narrow space, indeed. Knowing with certitude which acts fall in this narrow space will
never be easy. But the knowledge that it exists should give all Stewards of the Army Profession,
including General Dempsey, the confidence that, if prudential military judgment dictates, they will
not be violating their profession’s ethic if they do “engage publicly.”
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